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dealers took advantage of this state of things to increase the price. They became in fact qualified monopolists, that is, they sought to control the price to a certain extent. When the condition of the market was found out by the builders, they rushed to the dealers to get their wants supplied in order to complete their work. The exchangeability of the laths suddenly increased, — the builders were willing to pay more for them, — and so the dealers could get the additional price which they had fixed. But suppose the builders had met together and agreed not to pay the advance, but to send elsewhere for their supplies, would the advance have continued? Certainly not; it would have sunk down till the purchases were sufficient in number and quantity bought to satisfy the dealers. So it will be found in every case. Personal effort and willingness of deprivation fix the extremes of price, while the variations between them are dependent upon exchangeability, which in turn is affected by many causes, the chief of which may be mentioned as difficulty of attainment.\*

ALBERT S. BOLLES.

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- ART. III. — 1. *The Political and Historical Works of LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.* 2 vols. London. 1852.  
2. *Histoire du Second Empire.* Par TAXILL DELORD. 3 vols. Paris. 1869–1873.  
3. *La Lutte Électorale en 1863.* Par. JULES FERRY. Paris. 1863.  
4. *Du Suffrage Universel et de la Manière de voter.* Par H. TAINE. Paris. 1872.  
5. *La Réforme Électorale en France.* Par ERNEST NOVILLE. Paris. 1871.

UPON no other feature of the government of Napoleon III. has perhaps so great stress been laid by his apologists and supporters as upon that of universal suffrage. The position has often been taken, that, whatever charges may be preferred

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\* Or labor.

and sustained against the Second Empire, the fact is undeniable that the Emperor received the hearty support of the people, — of the people, too, in the enjoyment of universal suffrage. Many even who themselves have no words of favor for some of the features of that government, claim that it was entitled to support on the very principles of republicanism itself, inasmuch as the result of repeated elections showed that it was the government which a vast majority of the people desired. In the light of such recent authorities as have come to us, we propose to examine the correctness of the claims thus advanced. We shall first inquire into the views of Napoleon concerning the political rights of the masses of the people, and then we shall try to ascertain how far these views were carried out when he came into actual power.

During those turbulent years which intervened between the Révolution of 1830 and the *Coup d'État* of 1851 Louis Napoleon took care that the people of France should not be ignorant of his political opinions. Scarcely was Louis Philippe seated on his throne when the publication of the "Political Reveries," embodying Napoleon's "Ideas of a Constitution," made the nation fully aware that Napoleonism had still a living representative, and that this representative entertained definite and positive ideas in regard to the manner in which France should be governed. One who, at the present day, looks over that pamphlet, is surprised that it left no more permanent impression upon the minds of the French people. But then, again, we cannot help reflecting that, in the days of the Republic, those days when the people needed to know what Napoleon had written, there was no freedom of the press, and consequently no revelation and discussion of the thoughts and purposes that the President was entertaining. At the present day it is easy to see that the people had abundant reason to anticipate the ultimate establishment of an empire; for, whatever may be thought of the means by which the imperial throne was set up, it must be admitted that the *fact* of its establishment was entirely consistent with the views which, from the first, Napoleon had advocated. It is a fact of no small importance, that in his first sketch of a constitution, published as early as 1832, the whole scheme of his government was foreshadowed. This in-

strument reminds one of the "*Souper de Beaucaire*," written by Napoleon I. when he was yet a student; for both of these essays, though inherently very unlike, sketched out, with surprising accuracy, the courses which their authors were subsequently to pursue. It is at first thought one of the surprising elements of the Revolution of 1848, that the people were willing to intrust the destinies of the Republic to the hands of one who was so pronounced an Imperialist; but an easy and complete explanation is to be found in the fact that the people cared very little for republicanism, while they cared very much for stability and order. Contrary to the popular impression in America, and for reasons perfectly easy to explain, the masses of the French people, since the overthrow of the First Empire, have shown themselves to be eminently conservative. Amid all the revolutions and political discords that have distracted the country, one feeling has been dominant in the hearts of the peasantry, one ambition has inspired them, one impulse has directed them. Whatever innovation they have had forced upon them, they have accepted it willingly, provided it has brought, or even promised to bring, security to their possessions and their earnings. This fact was the supreme element of strength in the cause of Napoleon III. He early discovered it, and he kept it constantly in view. Of all the Napoleonic family, as Monsieur Delord assures us, this nephew of the first Emperor alone had faith in the restoration of the dynasty; and this faith, it might be added, was founded on a thorough understanding of the desires and sympathies of the great mass of the French people. Inspired by this understanding of the peasantry, and encouraged by this confidence in the future destiny of his family, he had no difficulty in determining what course to pursue. It was only necessary that he should keep himself and his political doctrines before the people; the time would evidently come when both he and his theories, if acceptable to the nation, would be called into action. He took good care that both of these conditions should be fulfilled.

In the early political essays of Louis Napoleon two dominant ideas prevail: the first, that the people are the supreme authority in the nation, the second, that the reins of government should be in the hands of an emperor. Beginning with the

saying of Montesquieu, that "the people, in whom is the sovereign power, ought to do by itself all that it can," he proceeds to show how the will of the people has been stifled, and how the welfare of the nation depends upon its being set free. All political power, he argues, must emanate from the people, and yet, to prevent its abuse, it must be under the constant guidance of a controlling hand. There are two things to be dreaded, absolute power on the one hand, and the Reign of Terror on the other. Under the name of Napoleon there is no occasion to dread the latter, under the shadow of a republic there can be no apprehension of the former. What France needs, then, is a form of government in which the whole people, without distinction, should take part in the election of representatives of the nation. The "masses, which can never be corrupted, and which can never flatter nor dissemble, must be made the constant source from which all power should emanate." "From the opinions which I advance," he says, "it will be seen that my principles are entirely republican." "If, in my scheme of a constitution," he continues, "I give preference to the monarchical form of government, it is because I consider that such a government would be best adapted to France; because it would give greater guarantees of tranquillity, greater strength and greater liberty than any other." Again he says, "At the accession of each new emperor, the sanction of the people will be required. If the sanction is refused, the two Chambers will propose another sovereign in his place. As the people will not have the right of election, but only that of approval, this law will not present the inconveniences of an elective monarchy, which have always been a source of discussion; it will, on the other hand, be a security against political convulsions." Then, coupled with these privileges of the people, there must be the "right of expressing their thoughts and opinions, whether through the medium of the press or in any other manner; as well as the rights of peaceably assembling, and of the free exercise of divine worship."

As early then as 1832 the people of France were informed with considerable clearness respecting the political doctrines of Napoleon. These theories, moreover, in the course of the following sixteen years, were often reiterated, but always with-

out important modification. In 1839, for example, the "*Idées Napoléoniennes*" presented the same political notions in a more elaborate form. This somewhat pretentious essay was little more than the body of the former one clad in another, and more seductive costume. The profusion of ornaments brought from the glorious days of the First Empire, and paraded in contrast with the poverty-stricken degeneracy of these latter days, served only to advocate a return to the imperial *régime*, and to reveal the good things in store for the people in case they should avail themselves of their legitimate sovereignty. Again, in 1841, the author took occasion to revive his favorite theme, and to elaborate more fully his ideas of the true sphere of a monarch. Guizot's History of the English Revolution had just been published, and had presented to the public in a powerful light the opinions of that eminent statesman in regard to what should be the position of the constitutional sovereign on all matters of national policy. The view advocated by Guizot was that which he afterward in the service of Louis Philippe so well exemplified, namely, that the monarch should be a moderator or manager of diverse influences in the state, rather than a leader of public opinion. Nothing could be more opposed to the Napoleonic idea of a government. It had been no part of the First Emperor's policy to wait for an expression of popular opinion before he took action; it had been his habit rather to act independently of that opinion, and to trust to the moral force of the accomplished fact for its ratification. The nephew was no more inclined to follow the lead of the people than was the uncle. When, therefore, Guizot's history appeared, it afforded the prisoner at Ham an opportunity which he was not likely to neglect. He needed to keep himself before the people, and to have the people entertain what he believed to be correct notions of the proper relations of the governing and the governed. Both of these ends he did something to obtain in the paper referred to. Reviewing the whole period of the English Revolution, he had no difficulty in finding material which he could press into the service of Napoleonism. Guizot had taken the ground that the great fault of the Stuarts was that they never recognized the spirit of the age; in other words, that they set up for themselves an ideal of royalty which

was utterly repugnant to those aspirations for liberty that had now become all pervasive and irresistible. The Stuarts, he maintained, should have submitted to the inevitable, should have allowed themselves to be led in the same manner as the monarchs of England are led at the present time. Bonaparte, however, arrived at a far different conclusion. While he recognized the failure of the Stuarts, he saw that they could have succeeded only by adopting a method very different from that suggested by Guizot. They should have put themselves at the head of the ideas of their age. It was the part of monarchy to lead, not to be led. The English Revolution should have resulted in the establishment of royalty upon a firmer basis, not chiefly through the efforts of the people dragging on the monarchs, but through the exertions of the monarchs supported and encouraged by the people. "Revolutions conducted by a chief," said he, "generally turn exclusively to the advantage of the people; for to insure success, the chief is obliged to give himself up to the national spirit; and to support himself he must remain faithful to the interests which secured his triumph; while, on the contrary, revolutions made by a multitude often turn to the profit of the chief only, for the reason that the people think on the morrow of victory that their wish is accomplished, and it is in their nature to discontinue for a long period all the efforts which were requisite to obtain that victory." It was in accordance with this general law, argued Bonaparte, that the Stuarts failed utterly and that William succeeded. The former made war simply to support their tottering power, the latter solely to increase the influence of England. "The Stuarts ruled by means of the crowd, and beheld only confusion around them; William saw the object at once, rushed forward, and drew the crowd after him." Finally the Prince sums up and concludes his essay in this *ad-captandum* manner.

"The history of England calls loudly to monarchs: —

"MARCH AT THE HEAD OF THE IDEAS OF YOUR AGE, AND THEN THOSE IDEAS WILL FOLLOW AND SUPPORT YOU.

"IF YOU MARCH BEHIND THEM THEY WILL DRAG YOU ON.

"IF YOU MARCH AGAINST THEM THEY WILL CERTAINLY CAUSE YOUR DOWNFALL."

Thus in the early writings of Napoleon III. we find three dominant political ideas. He maintains, first, that all political power dwells in the people and emanates from the people ; secondly, that the official to be at the head of the French people should be, not a president, but an emperor ; and, thirdly, that the initiative of all political innovations should be taken, not by the people or by their legislative representatives, but by the monarch.

Now in these three propositions are there not bound up all the evils that came upon France during the public career of Napoleon III. ? They do not, perhaps, embody the possibility of his first acquiring power, — that depended in large measure upon the character of the government already existing, — but when once the power was in his hands, did they not open to him every possibility of usurpation ? It may be answered that, according to his “ Ideas of a Constitution,” the people were to have the reserved power of a negative upon his acts, and that therefore they were always to have in their own hands the means of restraining him. This answer is specious, and yet it is fraught with error. In every nation where the government alone has the right of initiative according to the Napoleonic idea, the sole power of the people is to choose whether to the appeal of the government for support it will say “ yes ” or whether it will say “ no.” All the provisions of a constitution, be that constitution ever so complicated or ever so simple, can do nothing more for the nation than to provide a means whereby the people may give a categorical answer to such questions as the emperor may see fit to propound. Under circumstances ideally favorable, an honest expression of public opinion on a question so proposed might be secured ; but under ordinary circumstances such an expression would always be impossible. The question would often take the form of a choice between two evils, when it would be decided in the affirmative by that universal disposition of human nature that

. . . . makes us rather bear those ills we have,  
Than fly to others that we know not of.

It is readily admitted that such a method of voting may, for certain purposes, be quite legitimate, and entirely unobjectionable. Such would generally be the fact in all cases where it

would be equally easy to foresee the results of a negative and of an affirmative vote. But in a nation where the government alone has the initiative, the result of a negative vote can never be foretold with any degree of certainty. In a land, too, like that of France, where to a large extent the peasantry own their homes, such uncertainty is especially intolerable. The consequence is that whenever the French people have been appealed to by *plébiscite*, they have not only in every case answered in the affirmative, but their majority has amounted often almost to unanimity.\*

These facts were perfectly understood by Louis Napoleon. In his "Napoleonic Ideas" he placed these figures in array, not, indeed, for the purpose of showing the only thing which they are capable of showing, but in order to convince the people of the extraordinary popularity of his uncle's political ideas. It is at least apparent that he was familiar with the results of the appeals that had been made, and it is impossible to suppose that he had not interpreted their true meaning. It is fair to say that he could not but have seen that the French people, if asked to give either their assent to *un fait accompli* or their dissent from it, would, in all probability, support it with an overwhelming majority. History and human nature both pointed to the same result. He must have seen, therefore, that he needed only to secure a position from which he could appeal to the nation. With the sole right of initiative once in his possession, and with that almost absolute certainty of support which the situation necessarily secured, there could be no further obstacle in his way.

We have thus seen that the political sovereignty of the country would practically pass into the hands of Napoleon in case

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\* The following figures will serve to show the force of the circumstances to which we have alluded : —

|                                                     | Oui.      | Non.    |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Constitution of 1791 (not submitted to the people). |           |         |
| "    " 1793 . . . . .                               | 1,801,018 | 11,600  |
| "    " the year III. . . . .                        | 1,057,390 | 49,977  |
| Temporary Consulate . . . . .                       | 3,011,007 | 1,562   |
| Consulate for life . . . . .                        | 3,568,888 | 8,374   |
| Hereditary Empire (1804) . . . . .                  | 3,521,675 | 2,579   |
| Presidency of ten years . . . . .                   | 7,439,216 | 646,737 |

of his elevation to power. This, however, does not prove that such a change would be disadvantageous to the nation. Whether it would or would not depends upon the character of the ruler and the political condition of the people. If the masses of the people are so devoid of political ability as to take no serious interest in political affairs, or if, indeed, for any reason, they are unable to govern themselves as well as they would be likely to be governed, the only practical question then is, Who should govern them? Shall it be a person upon whom are imposed certain practicable constitutional restraints? or shall it be one who takes the power into his own hands, leaving with the people only so much as they can never use? There would appear to be no doubt that the choice of the former would always be the safer; and yet it must be admitted that, under conceivable circumstances, the latter might be deliberately chosen as the only possible cure for anarchy. Did such circumstances exist in France? Whatever others may think, it is certain that every Frenchman would answer the question with an emphatic negative. It would not for a moment be admitted that Louis Napoleon was chosen because the nation despaired of governing itself; on the contrary, it is maintained that he was accepted as the best *means* of governing itself. He was chosen as President for no other reason than because he had captivated the people with his name, his ideas, and his promises.

We have glanced at the fundamental character of his political ideas; it may be well to look for a moment at the nature of his promises.

The necessity of assurances of more than ordinary force were doubtless apparent to the mind of Napoleon. He must have seen that the nation would never consent to deliver itself over into the hands of a master until it was at least convinced that the proposed master would not abuse his power. Accordingly, not only in his essays, but also in his letters, we have the most emphatic declarations which it would be possible to make. In the essay on the "Extinction of Pauperism," which he wrote when imprisoned at Ham, a plausible appeal was made to the masses of the nation. The author draws a vivid picture of the deplorable condition of the working classes: —

"Industry has now neither rule, nor organization, nor aim. It is an

engine which works without a regulator. It cares nothing for the human force it employs, crushing men and materials equally under its wheels. It depopulates the country; conglomerates the people into small spaces without room to breathe; weakens the mind as well as the body, and afterwards throws these men on the world, when she no longer requires them,—men who have sacrificed their strength, their youth, and their existence to her service. Industry devours her children and lives only by their destruction; she is the true Saturn of labor. Must we, then, to remedy these defects, place her under a yoke of iron, rob her of this liberty which is her sole existence; in a word kill her because she is a murderess, without profiting by the immense benefits which she confers? We think it is sufficient to cure those she has wounded, and to protect her from wounds.”

Having thus stated the case, the essayist proceeds to show how all the benefits of good society might be disseminated among the working classes. There is a great array of figures to demonstrate how large a part of the lands of France remain uncultivated, how on a sort of joint-stock principle the unemployed laborers might be formed by the government into affluent communities, and how in this manner “pauperism might be extirpated, if not entirely, at least in a great measure.” The plan proposed was a kind of socialism, exactly fitted to captivate that large class of people in France which is ever waiting for some new phantasm,—the same class which, a generation before, had gone into ecstasies over the dreams of Mably and Saint-Just. From this presentation of Bonaparte’s views, the common people had a right to regard him as pledged to the rapid amelioration of their condition in case of his elevation to power.

But other and more definite assurances were not wanting. The numerous letters with which he regaled his friends were filled with articles of political faith, all teaching and enforcing the same doctrine. In public and in private he apparently neglected no opportunity to make his views known. In September of 1840, when he was brought to trial for the affair of Boulogne, he founded his defence exclusively on the fact that the people in the nation were sovereign, and that in their sovereign capacity they had elevated his family to supreme political power. That sovereignty, he assured his judges, had been consecrated by the most powerful revolution in history. It had

expressed itself in favor of the Constitution of the Empire with suffrages almost unanimous. That grand act of sovereignty the nation had never revoked ; and, as the Emperor had declared, " Whatever has been done without its authority is illegal."

Here, it will be seen, was an open defiance of the authority of Louis Philippe. The declaration clearly meant, if it meant anything, that the Empire was at that moment the legally established government in France. To his assertions on that point he added these words : —

" At the same time, do not allow yourselves to believe that, led away by the impulses of a personal ambition, I have wished by these acts to attempt in France a restoration of the Empire. I have been taught too noble lessons, and have lived with too noble examples before me, to do so. I was born the son of a king who descended without regret from a throne on the day when he had reason to believe that it was no longer possible to conciliate with the interests of France those of the people whom he had been called to govern. The Emperor, my uncle, preferred to abdicate the Empire rather than accept by treaty the restricted frontier, while he could not but expose France to the insults and the menaces in which foreign nations to this day permit themselves to indulge. I have not lived a single day forgetful of these lessons. In 1830, when the people recognized their sovereignty, I expected that the policy of the following days would be as loyal as the conquest itself, and that the destinies of France would be established forever. Instead of this the country has undergone the melancholy experiences of the past ten years. Under such circumstances, I considered that the vote of four millions of my countrymen, which had elevated my family to supreme power, imposed upon me the duty, at least, of making an appeal to the nation, in order to ascertain its will."

This address, cleverly compounded of truth and falsehood, and spoken in the ears of all Frenchmen, when stripped of its conventional circumlocution proclaimed these political doctrines. The people of France are sovereign. In their sovereign capacity they chose the hereditary empire of Napoleon as their government, and they have never revoked that choice. That empire, therefore, is now *de jure* the government of France, and I am *de jure* the Emperor. That I abstain from claiming the imperial throne is not because I have no right to it, but because I have learned from the examples of my father and

my uncle to practise self-denial when the welfare of the nation requires it.

Now it is difficult to conceive how any more dangerous doctrine could have been enunciated. There was embodied in it the perpetual right to wage war upon the government for the recovery of lost possessions. Under ordinary circumstances such a declaration would, of course, be of no importance; but in view of the dissatisfied condition of the nation, in view of that great stress which Bonaparte had laid upon the sovereignty and welfare of the people, by which he had already secured great popularity with the masses, and, above all, in view of the powerful spell which the name of Napoleon continued to work upon the nation, it is strange beyond measure that the danger was not more fully comprehended. It would seem that ordinary intelligence must have perceived that there was needed only the factor of unscrupulousness to make the conditions of every evil possibility complete. In case an opportunity should come within reach, everything would depend upon the integrity of a man who had as yet given no proof of political virtue, and whose ideal, furthermore, was the hero of the 18th Brumaire.

Bonaparte did not fail to guard against the fears which would be naturally aroused by these various circumstances. His writings abound in expressions calculated to allay them. He gives a sufficient amount of assurance, and expresses a becoming horror of political dishonesty. To the editor of the *Journal du Loiret* he wrote from Ham in October of 1843:—

“I have never claimed any other rights than those of a French citizen, and I never shall have any other desire than to see the whole people, legally convened, choosing fully the form of government which they might think it best to have. As a member of a family which owes its elevation to the suffrages of the nation (*sic!*) I should belie my origin, my nature, and, what is more, I should do violence to common-sense, if I did not admit the sovereignty of the people as the fundamental basis of all political organization.”

In commenting upon this letter the editor of the *Journal du Loiret* used these words:—

“It is an evidence of the all-powerful virtue of the democratic principle, and it is also an evidence of high-mindedness, to see a man of

royal blood, heir to a throne, a young prince, intelligent and proud, popular for the name he bears and the glorious souvenirs which that name recalls, thus ridding himself of monarchial prejudices, abdicating the privileges of his race, and paying a solemn homage to the sovereignty of the people. We highly compliment Prince Louis for the noble sentiments expressed in this letter."

Such expressions as these, though rather too suggestive of Sir Peter Teazle, are of some value as showing how the Prince's professions were regarded. Strictly speaking, there was at that moment no Napoleonic party in France; and for that reason, perhaps, the comments of the journals should be regarded as reflecting all the more correctly the sentiments of the public.

Again, in 1848, when the Prince learned that it was proposed in the Assembly to retain the law of exile as regarding him alone, he wrote to the House of Delegates an appeal, which concluded as follows:—

"The same reasons which made me take up arms against the government of Louis Philippe would lead me, if my services were required, to devote myself to the defence of the Assembly, the result of universal suffrage. In the presence of a king elected by two hundred deputies, I might have recollected that I was heir to an empire founded on the consent of four millions of Frenchmen. In the presence of the national sovereignty, I can and I will claim no more than my rights as a French citizen; but these I will demand with that energy which an honest heart derives from the knowledge of never having done anything unworthy of its country."

These words would seem to be sufficiently assuring, but others were more so. In July of the same year, the Prince, then at London, received word that he had been elected to the National Assembly by the people of Corsica. It is evident that he was hoping for something better, and he therefore wrote to the President of the Assembly a letter which is a curious mixture of arrogance and humility. After declaring that the same reasons which had compelled him to refuse other demands imposed upon him the necessity of another sacrifice, he added:—

"Without renouncing the idea of the honor of being one day a representative of the people, I consider it to be my duty to wait before re-

turning to the bosom of my country, till my presence in France may not in any way serve as a pretext for the enemies of the Republic. *I wish that my disinterestedness should prove the sincerity of my patriotism; I wish that those who charge me with ambition should be convinced of their error.*

"Have the goodness, Monsieur le Président, to inform the Assembly of my resignation, and of my regret at not being able yet to participate in its labors, and of my ardent wishes for the happiness of the Republic."

The "disinterestedness" by which he wished to "prove the sincerity of his patriotism" appears in a strong light when we find that only a few days later he wrote to his friend, General Piat, at Paris, that, if he were again elected, he should accept. This declaration was duly accepted, and, consequently, in September he was chosen by the electors of four different departments. He determined to sit for the capital; and thus the "sacrifice" by which he wished to "prove the sincerity of his patriotism," while it deprived him of Corsica, gave him Paris.

On the 26th of September, the nephew of the Emperor took his seat in the Assembly in the midst of a scene of considerable agitation. He at once mounted the tribune and read a short but carefully prepared speech. It was the first official act of his life, and was a most solemn profession of devotion to the Republic.

"I feel it incumbent on me," said he, "to declare openly, on the first day I am allowed to sit in this hall, the real sentiments which animate, and have always animated me. After being proscribed during thirty-three years, I have at last recovered a country and the rights of citizenship. The Republic has conferred on me that happiness. *I offer it now my oath of gratitude and devotion, and the generous fellow-countrymen who sent me to this hall may rest certain that they will find me devoted to the double task which is common to us all, namely, to assure order and tranquillity, the first want of the country, and to develop the democratical institutions which the people have a right to claim.* During a long period I could only devote to my country the meditations of exile and captivity. To-day a new career opens to me. Admit me to your ranks, dear colleagues, with the sentiment of affectionate sympathy which animates me. *My conduct, you may be certain, shall ever be guided by a respectful devotion to law. It will prove, to the confusion of those who have attempted to slander me, that no man is more devoted than I am, I repeat, to the defence of order and the consolidation of the Republic.*"

This address was heard with every mark of approbation and satisfaction. It was almost universally accepted as a sufficient pledge of good faith. In the course of the ensuing discussions on the Constitution, it was only at rare intervals that a word indicative of suspicion or distrust was uttered; and even then assurance was restored by the unfailing tact of the Prince. In the course of the discussion of that portion of the Constitution which pertains to the Presidency, M. Thouret proposed the insertion of a proviso to the effect that no member of the families which had reigned over France should be elected President or Vice-President of the French Republic. The amendment was opposed by M. Lacaze and others, who urged that it proposed a law of proscription unworthy of a great people, and that the chief of the imperial family, against whom the amendment was particularly directed, had come forward, and from the tribune protested his devotion to the Republic. This opened the way to the Prince himself, who said "that he was too grateful to the nation for restoring him to his rights as a citizen to have any other ambition. It was not in his own name, but in the name of three hundred thousand electors, that he protested against the appellation of 'Pretender,' which was continually flung in his face."

"These words," says the report, "were followed by the greatest agitation." Finally, M. Thouret arose and said: "*In consequence of what has been said by Monsieur Louis Bonaparte, I withdraw the amendment.*"

While these discussions were going on, Socialist banquets were taking place in various parts of the realm, and the name of Louis Napoleon was beginning to be talked of in connection with the Presidency. This fact introduced into the Assembly an instantaneous element of discord. It was evident that there were some, at least, who were not altogether satisfied with the Prince's fair promises as to his future. M. Clement Thomas inveighed against him in the most violent terms. In the course of his speech he did not hesitate to charge him with covering the country with emissaries recommending his candidature to the peasantry. Finally, he startled the Assembly by declaring: "Louis Napoleon is not a candidate for the Presidency, *but for the Imperial Dignity.*" The instantaneous effect

of this prophetic outburst was the suspension of the session, and a challenge from M. Pierre Bonaparte; the less immediate, but more important, result was another speech from the Prince, containing other "satisfactory assurances." In the mean time his candidacy for the position of President was declared, and it was necessary that he should attend to his interests with the people. Accordingly he lost no time in publishing an address to his fellow-citizens. He reiterated his doctrines concerning the sovereignty of the people, the rights of labor, and the relief of poverty. Then, for the purpose of allaying any doubts which might be entertained concerning himself and his future, he crowned all his assurances by using these words: —

"I am not an ambitious man, who dreams at one time of the empire and of war, at another of the adoption of subversive theories. Educated in free countries, and in the school of misfortune, I shall always remain faithful to the duties which your suffrages and the will of the Assembly may impose upon me. If I am elected President, I shall not shrink from any danger or from any sacrifice to defend society which has been so audaciously attacked. *I shall devote myself wholly, without mental reservation, to the confirming of a Republic which has shown itself wise by its laws, honest in its intentions, great and powerful by its acts. I pledge my honor to leave to my successor at the end of four years the executive power strengthened, liberty intact, and a real progress accomplished.*"

Such were the assurances which Louis Napoleon gave to the French people. We have dwelt upon the subject thus at length for the purpose of showing not only that the nation had every means of making themselves familiar with his political doctrines, but also that he was pledged in the most formal and definite manner to a given line of policy. Early in life he perceived the spell with which the name of his uncle bound the mass of Frenchmen, who had forgotten the disasters of 1815, and he saw how that spell might be turned to his own advantage. He comprehended how, under a system of universal suffrage, the peasantry would be the governing body, and how, if secured in their prosperity, they would always be ready to adhere to a strong executive. He saw, also, that once in possession of an opportunity, with the sole right of the initiative in his hand, there would open before him every possibility of

power. Finally, he had not hesitated to give every possible assurance, and to hold out every possible inducement, in order that the opportunity might be conferred upon him.

It is not our purpose to comment on the events which transferred Louis Napoleon from the president's chair to the imperial throne. That they were the natural outgrowth of Napoleon's political creed, in no way detracts from the perfidious villany of an act to which it would be difficult to find a parallel since the days of Louis XI. It should, however, be borne in mind, that the acceptance by the French nation of Louis Napoleon and his political creed was the practical acceptance of a personal in distinction from a constitutional government. No matter what the details of a plan of government may be, if it gives the sole power of initiative into the hand of a single man, then hedges the people about with executive restraints so that they can never know what the result of a negative vote would be ; it is not only a personal government, but a personal government of the worst form. It is of the worst form, because, in addition to all the evils which characterize the general species, it is a deception and a fraud. It is commonplace to say that an evil which is known to be such may be avoided or guarded against, while one that arrays itself in the garb of virtue carries with it a weapon which it is always difficult and sometimes impossible to avoid. It might be said that even political poisons are not very dangerous if they are properly labelled. Perhaps the worst feature of Napoleonism was the very fact, that, while it carried in its essential nature the ready means of violating any law with impunity, it professed that reverence for law as a fixed rule of action, both for governments and for individuals, without which there can be neither liberty nor order. It is probable that neither of the Napoleons would have hesitated to adopt in theory even that ideal devotion to legal authority which the genius of Plato has so beautifully illustrated in his account of the last conversations and death of Socrates ; and yet it would be easy to show that in all essential characteristics the Second Empire was a government of men and not of laws, of will and not of reason, of arbitrary and not of limited and legal power.

The favorite argument of the adherents of Napoleon has

been, that, under a system of universal suffrage, it would be impossible for the Emperor to impose upon the nation a system of government that was repugnant to the majority of the people. It has often been asserted that, even admitting what is said about the servility of France in obeying the head of the State, she has done it all with her own free will. After a solemn appeal made to the whole population, she chose Napoleon as her ruler ; and “ she possesses in the *Corps Législatif* an organ through which her voice may be heard with less chance of being mistaken than even the public voice in the Parliament of England ; for there the right of suffrage is restricted to a few, whereas in France it belongs to the whole adult male population.” In a word, whenever it has been asserted that the power of Napoleon rested on the bayonet, the reply has been an appeal to the testimony of the ballot-box.

Now the strength of this argument, it will be universally admitted, can be understood only when the character of the ballot-box in France is known. Is the ballot-box, then, a truthful witness ? Is the testimony which it gives a reality or a sham ? These questions can be answered only by an inspection of such facts as come within reach. If it can be demonstrated that the people have absolute freedom of choice at the elections, the force of the argument will have to be admitted ; if, on the contrary, it becomes manifest that the French executive exercises such an influence over the elections as to make a free choice impossible, the position will readily be conceded to have no strength whatever. For our own part, we have no hesitation in declaring it as our belief that the process of elections in France under the Second Empire was nothing less than a gigantic swindle. We believe it to have been a mere device with which to entrap a people into giving their assent to propositions which would not be assented to either by lawful representatives or by electors in the exercise of absolute freedom of choice. We believe it to have been a palpable cheat, which, but for the gravity of its results, would become a laughing-stock in proportion as the facts concerning it came to be known and understood. We believe, moreover, that we could bring before our readers an array of facts which would amply show that the result obtained by the ballot-box under the Second Empire no

more represented the wishes of the people of France than it would if they had been marched up to the poll under military escort, and compelled at the point of the bayonet to vote in accordance with the dictates of the Emperor. A few of these facts, gathered from such works as have recently been published on the Second Empire, it is now our purpose to present.

It will aid us in our estimation of these facts, if we bear in mind one of the important characteristics of government in France as distinguished from government in England or America. In our own country we have of late heard something of executive interference in affairs of a local nature, and yet it must be admitted that the distinctive feature of that liberty of which we boast is entire freedom from such interference, in other words, is self-government. Our numerous municipal and local corporations manage a vast amount of public business with as little interference of the executive as would be possible if that executive did not exist. But the very reverse of this is the case in France. There is a passage in Forsyth's "*History of Trial by Jury*" which admirably describes the characteristic to which we refer.

"The government there, under whatever form, whether that of Directory, Consulship, Empire, Restoration, Monarchy of the Barricades, Republic, or the Army, which is its present phase, has always been essentially despotic in its character. It has ruled by a system of paid *employés* in immediate dependence upon itself. The provincial functionaries, such as prefects and sub-prefects and mayors of arrondissements, are mere puppets, whose strings are pulled by the executive in Paris. In no country is the system of police surveillance and espionage more thoroughly understood or constantly practised. No public meetings are convened, as in England, to take into consideration the measures of government, and, if necessary, organize a peaceful opposition to them. The people are not, except in the solitary instance of dropping their individual votes into the ballot-box when the period of an election comes round, made parties to the management of their own interests. Hence there is, properly speaking, no public opinion in France, the influence of which can be felt by statesmen, and enable them to forecast the measures which will be best suited for the wants, and most in accordance with the real wishes, of the nation. Hence also results the startling paradox that the French, of all people in the world, are the most impatient of constitutional control, and the most servilely submissive to despotic power." — p. 143.

From the characteristics of the French government so well described, it will be seen that the executive has at hand the means of exerting an influence on the elections such as would be impossible in a country with a government like our own.

We shall now proceed to show the manner in which this influence was exerted, and the extent to which it made itself felt. We shall not speak of the *plébiscite* for the reason that its true character is well enough understood already. Only as an example of irony can that be called an election by which the people are merely asked to say *Yea* or *Nay* to something which has already been established by military force. We shall select examples of a nature calculated to afford absolute freedom of choice, examples which under any free government would present to the people a fair alternative between two or more proposals or between two or more candidates. Our examples will be the vote on the annexation of Nice and Savoy, and the vote at the general election in 1863.

By the treaty of the 24th of March, 1860, it was agreed between France and Italy that Savoy and Nice, "after the population had been consulted," should be ceded to France, and that Tuscany and the Romagna should also, after a similar "consultation," be annexed to Sardinia. By the terms of the treaty the annexation of these respective territories was made no less advantageous to Victor Emmanuel than to Napoleon. With Austria vindictive and powerful, and in a threatening strategical position; with the Pope outraged and desperate, and in control of an army which attached to itself a large share of the fanaticism of Europe,—there was no hope for struggling Italy but in a firmer alliance with France. In this fact alone is to be found an explanation of the willingness of the Sardinian government to part with so considerable a portion of its territory. Reasons enough existed why King and Emperor were equally anxious that the people should vote for annexation.

The fifth article of the Sardinian Constitution provides that "treaties which shall make any alteration in the territories of the State shall not take effect until after they have obtained the consent of the Chamber." In view of this provision, it was manifestly the duty of the government to submit the treaty to the Chamber for ratification before the popular vote should be

taken, inasmuch as it was only by virtue of the treaty that the people would be entitled to vote at all. But there were dangers in this method of procedure which the Sardinian government did not fail to foresee. The project of annexation was not popular in Parliament, — indeed, it was likely to fail. Garibaldi did not hesitate to raise his voice, in season and out of season, against it; and, what was of the greatest importance, as showing the untrammelled desires of the people most affected, *every one of the delegates from Nice and Savoy to Parliament had been elected with the express understanding that they were to protest against such a transfer to another power.* In the short time that allowed of effort, thirteen thousand signatures were obtained to a protest against annexation. In view of these inconvenient facts, it was determined to postpone a ratification by Parliament until a popular vote, unanimous or nearly unanimous, had been secured. It seems to have been of no consequence that the treaty, according to which the vote was to be taken, really had no existence until it was ratified by the Chamber; it was determined to proceed as though it had been ratified, and then to use the advantage gained by this procedure to secure its ratification.

Accordingly, measures were instituted to secure such a popular vote as was desired. First of all, the Sardinian troops were withdrawn, and their places were filled by French garrisons. The opposition of the inhabitants of Nice to becoming French was indicated by the fact that the troops, on first entering the city, were received so roughly that they were obliged to resort to the use of the bayonet. The municipal junta sent a vote of thanks to those members of the English Parliament who had spoken in opposition to French annexation. The French Consul wrote to his government, that, if a French man-of-war did not come to Villa Franca, his own life and that of his family would not be secure. After the said ship arrived, the editor of the newly established French organ, *L'Avenir de Nice*, was besieged in his house, and obliged to rush down to Villa Franca for refuge.

Such were some of the indications of public sentiment at the time when the French garrisons were taking their places. It was evident that the people were not to be easily overawed.

But the efforts of the government had only just begun. Immediately after the occupation of the country by French troops, there was published an order transferring the civil government of the provinces to France. The French provisional governor, Lubonis, made haste to use the power thus placed in his hands for the advantage of his imperial master, and his example was speedily followed by Lachinal. Many of the mayors and local authorities were utterly opposed to the idea of French annexation, and without their co-operation it was felt that a vote of the people in favor of the measure could not be insured. Accordingly the following circular, filled out as might in each case be required, was issued : —

“ THE GOVERNOR OF ANNECY.

“ Considering that Monsieur ———, mayor of the commune of ———, seems not to have accepted favorably the consequences of the Treaty of the 24th of March last ; considering that it is important, under the present circumstances, to have at the head of the administration of each commune men devoted to the new order of things ;

“ It is decreed, —

“ 1. Monsieur ———, present mayor of the commune of ———, is dismissed from his functions.

“ 2. The municipal counsellor ——— is charged, until a new order, with the administration of said commune.

“ 3. The above will be transmitted to Messieurs ——— and ———, for their guidance.

(Signed)

“ LACHINAL, Governor-Regent.

“ Annecy, April, 1860.”

In commenting upon this transfer of civil authority to the sole interests of the Emperor, the French journals gave evidence of abundant zeal. One of them, *Le Bon Sens*, remarked : —

“ A very important thing for the success of the great votation to which Savoy is about to be called is to have at the head of each commune a mayor thoroughly devoted to the French annexation, for it is he who should give the impulse and preside at the electoral operations. A mayor who is devoted to Piedmont, or having a Swiss leaning, will be altogether out of place on such an occasion. We learn with pleasure that a great purgation has already taken place in the province of Chambéry, of mayors, either hostile or suspected. We ask all sincere

friends of France to keep a sharp look-out upon their communal administration. We do not doubt that the governor of the province of Annecy will be ready, if such is the case, to make use of the full powers with which he is clothed, to replace in each commune all the mayors who will not loyally co-operate in the great cause of our national regeneration."

The military and civil machinery thus in order, the authorities now devoted themselves to the more immediate work of manufacturing the requisite majority. First of all, the public was informed not only that it was prohibited to hold any meetings to discuss the affairs of Nice, but also that no canvassing on the part of those opposed to French annexation would be permitted, and that no placards or circulars would be allowed to be issued by the Italian party. At the same time, documents of various kinds were issued by the officers in authority, appealing to their subordinates and to the people. The provisional governor, Lubonis, issued a proclamation, of which the following is the most important portion : —

"CITIZENS, — All uncertainty with reference to our future has ceased. By the Treaty of the 24th of March, the gallant King Victor Emmanuel has ceded to France Savoy and the arrondissement of Nice. The most powerful motives of political necessity, the exigencies of the future of Italy, the sentiment of gratitude toward his powerful ally, and, finally, the exceptional circumstances of our country, have decided, although with regret, our beloved sovereign to separate the provinces which have been for so many centuries intimately bound up with his dynasty. But the fate of a people does not rest exclusively with the desire of princes. Therefore the magnanimous Emperor Napoleon the Third and the loyal Victor Emmanuel have desired that this Treaty of Cession should be strengthened by the popular adhesion. . . . All opposition should fall powerless before the interests of the country and the sentiment of duty. Besides, it will find an insurmountable obstacle in the wishes themselves of Victor Emmanuel. . . . Fellow-citizens, the mission which the King has confided to me is transitory but important. In order to fulfil my task at this extraordinary juncture, I count upon the support of your co-operation, upon your respect for law, and upon the high degree of civilization to which you have raised yourselves. Hasten, therefore, to confirm by your suffrages the reunion of your country to France. In making ourselves the echo of the intentions of the King, let us unfurl the banner of that noble and great nation which

has always excited our lively sympathies. Let us rally round the throne of the glorious Emperor Napoleon the Third. Let us surround it with the same fidelity, so especial to our country, which we have always preserved to this day to Victor Emmanuel. As for this august Prince, let us retain among us the worship of bygone memories, and let us raise earnest prayers for his new and brilliant destiny. To the great Napoleon the Third, whose powerful and firm will is to open a new era of prosperity for our country, our inflexible fidelity, as well as our respectful devotion, will now commence.

“Vive la France!

“Vive L'Empereur Napoleon III.!

“*Le Gouverneur Provisionnel, LUBONIS.*”

A proclamation similar to this of Lubonis was issued by Malaussena, Mayor of Nice; and finally, as if to crown all, the Bishop came forward in the same interest, appealing to all loyal members of the Church to vote for annexation. Nor, indeed, was this all. The French Committee sent to all the officials a circular bearing the government seal, and appealing for support to all the authorities in town and country. Referring to the advantages to be derived from annexation, the Committee used these words:—

“We are convinced that the imperial government will recompense the people for the unanimity of their vote, and will proportion the reward according to the good disposition manifested by them. Without enumerating here the immense and incontestable advantages of every kind which our country would derive from its annexation to the great French Empire, we consider it our duty to address ourselves to all our friends and correspondents, not only to stimulate their zeal in favor of the common cause, and to engage them to use all their influence in order to insure the success of the vote in the French interest, but also that they may carefully watch and point out to us the steps that have been taken in a contrary interest by those in opposition, in order that the necessary measures may be taken to neutralize the influences which are hostile to the interests of the country. Will you have the goodness, M. —, to acknowledge the receipt of this, and to make known to us the spirit of your population, and that of the local authorities?”

The “necessary measures” to which the committee alluded were amply provided for. A sum of money had been placed at their disposal by the French government; and of this it is

stated on good authority that 3,000,000 francs were used in the direct work of bribery, exclusive of the expenses of the government on the day of voting. Drinking booths and *cafés* were erected especially for the purpose by the officials, and a tri-colored cockade or a voting ticket with "*oui*" upon it entitled the bearer to the gratuitous enjoyment of all their privileges.

Another device which appealed to the religious zeal of the people was that of blessing the standards of the imperial party. This official blessing of the French flags was calculated to work an immense effect upon the ignorant and somewhat superstitious population. The authorization ran in this way: —

"MM. les Commissaires will distribute the flags which MM. les Curés are authorized, and indeed invited, to bless. These standards will be in this case presented by the Commune, at the head of the inhabitants, to MM. les Curés, who will receive them at the entry of the church. Finally, you will understand the importance which I attach to this last recommendation. You will take care that official proclamations, manifestoes, and notices are preserved intact. All appeals to the passions — any notice whatever affixed without the required authorization — will be immediately torn down."

Side by side with this was posted the following official manifesto: —

"The Mayor of Bonneville notifies that the Communal Council will assist at the benediction of the flags which the Imperial Government has presented to the Commune; that this religious ceremony will take place on Sunday, the 22nd, at seven o'clock, A. M.; that the *cortège* will leave the Hotel de Ville to go to the church. All electors are invited to this ceremony, which will immediately precede the opening of the voting-urns. In the morning the Hotel de Ville will be decorated with the French flags and the national colors. All the inhabitants are invited to decorate their houses with flags of the same colors.

"The Imperial Government has made its *début* by a signal benefit in giving us the customs *zone*, which has hitherto been refused. It assures to us the prosperity of the country. Its generosity will not end here. French engineers have explored the province, have begun to study the banks of the rivers, the state of the roads, and the public works most useful to the country. The numerous mines of Faucigny will be worked, the condition of our *collège* will be improved. Let us

show our gratitude to the Emperor. Let us give a free course to our sympathies, so long restrained, and prove by a compact and unanimous vote that we are as much French as our fathers were.

“Vive l'Empereur !

“Vive la France !

(Signed)

“DUFOUR, Mayor.”

As the day of voting approached, the Central Committee issued the following circular : —

“SIR, — The Central Annexationist Committee, upon whose proceedings no restrictions were placed, has named you member of the Special Committee for the parish of ——. You will have the goodness, sir, to concert with your colleagues, Messrs. —, measures which may unite and bring to the poll on Sunday next the greatest possible number of electors, and take any steps which appear expedient, *in order that the vote of the population may be at the same time a striking manifestation of its sentiments towards France and towards the Emperor.*”

In addition to all the other pressure, the local police authorities openly declared that lists of the *proscrits* would be made out, and that those who abstained from voting would be punished as soon as they became French subjects. The same authorities received orders from head-quarters at Nice to collect the peasants on the day of voting and march them into town, with drums beating, and French flags floating at their head. An Englishman, who was at Nice at the time of the election, thus describes what he saw : —

“The first object which met my view, as I entered Nice on the morning of the 15th, was a procession of country people marching into town. At the head of the procession was a fat *curé*, arm-in-arm with the village syndic and another functionary ; behind were thirty or forty rustics, some of them extremely drunk, although early in the morning, carrying flags, beating drums, and cheering in a maudlin, irregular manner. The streets were crowded with persons wearing tri-colored cockades and carrying the *oui* voting-ticket in their hats. French soldiers, of whom there was a plentiful sprinkling, mingled freely with the crowd, although one battalion had been marched to Villa Franca, to give the authorities an opportunity of saying that, in order not to influence the vote, part of the French troops had left the town. The urns were placed in the National College, and thither I repaired to

watch the process of voting. The people crowded in and voted with scarcely a challenge ; lists of those registered were posted up outside ; but at first the votes were given too rapidly to enable the scrutineers to exercise any check. The *oui* ticket was distributed freely in the streets ; men stood at the corners as if they were advertising quack medicines, and gave you any number of "*ouis*," but I endeavored both in the shops and in the streets to procure a "*non*" without success. One boor I saw just about to vote two tickets. I asked him if such was his intention, and he naively answered, 'Why not?' 'O,' I said, 'it won't be fair ; give me one,' — which he most good-naturedly did at once. Another man to whom I spoke told me that he was strongly opposed to becoming French, — that he had two sons in the Sardinian service, one in the army and the other in the navy, that he himself was a poor boatman, and that he had voted *oui* against his inclination, because the police had told him that if he did not he would be imprisoned, — that the King whom he loved wanted it, — that England and all the powers wanted it, — and that as for his voting in the opposite sense he would simply get himself into a scrape and do no good. But he said promptly, 'I have neither cheered, nor will I wear a cockade.' As all the scrutineers were the nominees of Pietri (the French Agent of Police), and as they held the keys of the urns, there was, of course, no security against any number of *oui* tickets being put into them in private."

The same witness wrote subsequently from Bonneville, where he happened to be on the day of the voting in Savoy : —

"On the morning of the 22d I found myself once more at Bonneville in Faucigny ; but a considerable change had taken place in the aspect of affairs since I had left it less than a month before. From every house, and almost every window of every house, waved French flags. The hotel, which had formerly been the head-quarters of the anti-French party, and where I had dined with the members of the Committee, was tricked out in all the splendors of red, white, and blue. The bookseller's shop, where I had heard sentiments strongly hostile to France, now displayed a gigantic banner ; but, more remarkable than all, the house of the candidate who had contested Bonneville three weeks before on the Swiss interest, as opposed to the French, was now decorated with French flags. My old friends were nowhere to be found ; the Committee had evaporated, and throughout the town where party feeling had recently run so high, and anti-French annexation was rampant and openly expressed, there was not a syllable to be heard against it. A little shopkeeper, whom I knew formerly as a

furious anti-Frenchman, was now with difficulty dug out of his back-shop, and owned to having just voted in favor of France as an act of self-preservation. 'What could I do?' said he; 'the concierge de la ville brought me two tickets this morning, with a message from the intendant that if I did n't vote them it would be the worse for me. He also asked where my French flag was, and advised me, if I valued my liberty, to show one without delay. There is the flag, and here is the other voting-ticket; a similar one I have just voted, but this I present to you.'

'BULLETIN DE VOTATION.

La Savoie veut-elle être réunie à la France ?

Oui et Zone.'

"My informant went on to tell me that every voter had received his ticket from the police authorities, and he smiled when I asked him where I could procure a *non* ticket. 'No printing-house here would venture to print one,' he said; 'you would have to get them from Geneva.' The addition of the word '*Zone*' struck me as curious, and I asked the object of its insertion in the voting-ticket. The device was ingenious. The authorities, fearing that though the people had not the courage to vote *non* they might be bold enough to abstain from voting at all, gave it to be understood that such a course would not prevent their being annexed, but that they would thereby lose their commercial zone or free frontier with Switzerland, upon which their future prosperity would depend; in other words, by voting they would be annexed and get their zone,—by abstaining they would be equally annexed, but ruined. By a recent French circular I perceive it stated that the desire of the Emperor to carry out the conditions of neutrality, as laid down in the ninety-second article of the Treaty, has induced him to grant the Zone. It was originally invented as an election 'dodge,' and served its purpose admirably, being used either as a bribe or as a threat."

Such were the means by which the hostility of Nice and Savoy to French annexation was converted into an almost unanimous declaration in its favor. Under any circumstances whatever such a spectacle of organized trickery would be a painful thing to contemplate. It is possible to imagine a situation in which the ruler of the nation, for political reasons, might submit a question that had already been decided to the ratification of his people with no other evil result than that which might chance to be inflicted upon the people themselves. But in the case of Savoy and Nice there was an element in the transaction which made it an outrage upon the liberal senti-

ment of Europe and of the world. We refer to the repeated declarations that the votation would be perfectly *free*. The first article of the treaty declared that "it is understood between their Majesties that this re-union shall be effected without any constraint upon the will of the people, and that the government of the King of Sardinia and that of the Emperor of the French will agree as soon as possible upon the best means of arriving at and of confirming the manifestation of this will." Not long after the Treaty was formed, a deputation from Nice waited upon Victor Emmanuel, when he assured them "that he had stipulated as a condition of this cession a votation free from any external pressure, and promised that, if a military occupation took place, or if the condition was violated in any manner, he would protest"; and again, in the proclamation by which he released his subjects in Nice and Savoy from their allegiance, he gave them this assurance: "Under no circumstances will this great change in your destiny be imposed upon you; it must be the result of your free consent. Such is my firm determination; such also is the intention of the Emperor of the French." Finally, in the Chamber of Deputies, when the vigorous protest of Garibaldi seemed likely to put an end to the whole transaction, confidence was restored only when Count Cavour assured the deputies that "the vote should be absolutely free" (*pienamente libero*). And yet, in view of all these most solemn assurances, what have we seen? Italian troops removed and French troops put in their places; all the important civil offices filled with Frenchmen, or men committed to the support of the French cause; official circulars and placards advocating annexation scattered everywhere, while no publication of an opposing sentiment was anywhere allowed; ballot-boxes in exclusive control of French officers; ballots in favor of annexation distributed everywhere by the police, while ballots opposed to annexation could be procured only by sending to Geneva; priests blessing the flags presented by the Emperor, and appealing to the consciences of their people in behalf of France; money, as well as general free living and drinking, furnished by the imperial agents; and, finally, the people, with French music sounding and French banners flying, marched up *en masse* to the ballot-box, with priest and mayor arm-in-arm at their head.

Such was the boasted *free vote* with the sanction and help of which Nice and Savoy were annexed to France.

We come now to the consideration of our second example.

Under the *régime* of the Second Empire there was no way of imposing any restraint upon the will of the Emperor, excepting by means of the *Corps Legislatif*. As the senators and the counsellors of State were appointed by the crown, they could in no way be regarded as in any sense representatives of the people, — they were rather representatives of the Emperor himself. The possibility of frustrating the imperial will, that is to say, the possibility of preventing a pure absolutism, depended solely, therefore, upon the character of the representative body; the character of that body depended upon the political intelligence of the people and the freedom of the election. If it can be shown that the elections were not substantially free, it will be unnecessary to ask whether the masses of the people do or do not possess an unusual amount of political intelligence. If there is no opportunity on the part of the people for a free exercise of the political intelligence they may possess, it is not too much to say that, for political purposes, such intelligence is of no consequence whatever. We think it will not be difficult to convince our readers that the general elections in France were no more free than was the election in Nice and Savoy; no question, therefore, concerning the intelligence of the electors is relevant, excepting, perhaps, so far as is necessary to show how the farce of the elections was continuously possible.

It is difficult for us in America to comprehend the ignorance of a large portion of the rural population. To get an adequate notion of it, one should read the “*Madame Bovary*” of M. Flaubert. On the same subject there is ample food for meditation in the small work of M. Taine, the title of which is at the head of this article. We must be content to make a few extracts.

“ En France, sur cent personnes du sexe masculin, il y a trente-neuf illettrées, c’est à dire ne sachant pas lire ou ne sachant pas écrire. Comme ces illettrées appartiennent presque tous à la population rurale, cela fait dans cette population trente-neuf illettrées sur soixante-dix. Ainsi, l’on ne se trompe pas de beaucoup si l’on estime à sept sur quatorze, à la moitié du total, le nombre des électeurs ruraux

qui n'ont pas les premiers rudiments de l'instruction la plus élémentaire. Voilà déjà un indice d'après lequel on peut apprécier leur intelligence politique. Il m'est souvent arrivé de causer avec eux sur les affaires publiques. À quinze lieues de Paris, tel, cultivateur et petit propriétaire, ne savait pas ce que c'est le budget ; quand je lui disais que l'argent versé chez le percepteur entre dans une caisse à Paris pour payer l'armée, les juges, et le reste, qu'on tient registre de tous les recettes et dépenses, il ouvrait de grands yeux ; il avait l'air de faire une découverte. Après les premiers emprunts du second Empire, un fermier normand disait à un de mes amis, orléaniste : 'Ce n'est pas votre *gueux de Louis-Philippe* qui nous aurait donné de la rente à soixante-sept francs.' Après le coup-d'État, des cultivateurs me répétaient dans les Ardennes : '*Louis-Napoléon est très-riche, c'est lui qui va payer le gouvernement ; il n'y aura plus d'impôts.*' Je viens de lire la correspondance de vingt-cinq à trente préfets de 1814 à 1830 ; l'ignorance et la crédulité des populations rurales sont étonnantes. Au moment de l'expédition d'Espagne, des maires viennent demander au préfet du Loiret s'il est vrai que les alliés vont traverser le pays pour aller en Espagne et laisser en France une nouvelle armée d'occupation. *Pendant plusieurs années, dans plusieurs départements, au mois de mars, on croit fermement que Napoléon arrive à Brest avec quatre-cent-mille Américains, ou à Toulon avec quatre-cent-mille Turcs.*" — (p. 16 et seq.)

In regard to the intelligence of the people concerning the matters on which they are voting, the same author relates the following : —

"Là-dessus, dans les deux ou trois élections qui ont précédé la chute du second Empire, nous avons eu par les enquêtes des révélations étranges. Un témoin disait : 'J'avais les deux billets dans ma poche ; mais, ma foi ! bonnet blanc, blanc bonnet, c'était pour moi la même chose, et j'ai pris le premier venu.' Un autre, à peu de distance de Paris, répondait à un de mes amis : 'Je ne connaissais ni l'un ni l'autre ; alors, des deux, j'ai pris le bulletin qui m'allait le mieux à l'œil.' C'était la forme des lettres qui l'avait décidé. *Un troisième veut savoir quel est le bon bulletin ; on le lui dit, il va le mettre dans l'urne ; le lendemain, on lui demande ce qu'il a fait de l'autre.* 'OH ! JE L'AI DONNÉ À PIERRE, QUI EST UN MAUVAIS GARS ; IL A VOTÉ AVEC. C'EST BIEN FAIT, IL LE MÉRITE.' " — (p. 33.)

If it is difficult for an American to understand the political ignorance of the masses of the French peasantry, it is scarcely less so for him to comprehend the extreme centralization of

the government. M. Delord has compared it with a polyp having a countless number of tentacles :—

“The administrative tentacle,” says he, “begins with the prefect and ends with the cantonnier; the judicial tentacle extends from the attorney-general and the chief-justice to the village constable and the justice of the peace; the financial tentacle reaches from the secretary of the treasury to the collector of fines. Without mentioning a host of other similitudes, there are without number licenses, customs, imposts, commissioners of roads and bridges, with which the polyp enlaces the candidate, strangles him, and suffocates him; centralization is also an intelligent machine, complicated, and marvellously obedient to the hand that directs it. There is not a single function pertaining to government, even most remotely, which cannot be included within its gearing: notaries, attorneys, bailiffs, clerks, are all embraced. Centralization, if it cannot obtain from all these a formal and hearty support, imposes upon them at least neutrality.”

In other words, if, in our own country, the governors of the States, the judges of all the courts, the sheriffs, the police officers, the county commissioners, the mayors of the cities, the appraisers, the collectors of taxes and tolls, the officers and conductors of railroads, were all appointed by the government at Washington, and were responsible to that government alone, we should have in form, if not in spirit, something like the centralization which prevailed in France. Nor, indeed, was this all. M. Delord assures his readers that the police officers, as the more immediate agents of the executive, were specially “charged to stimulate the zeal of the local authorities. They were not content to enter into the house of the peasant; they penetrated into the deliberative assembly of the municipal council, and openly reproached its members if their zeal appeared to decline. The commissioner of police acted upon the people by a kind of terror. An elector of the opposition was traversing a village on the Gironde between two gendarmes, and the commissioner of police cried out: ‘There is a partisan of M. Decazes; that is the way we treat them.’”

The illustrations which we are about to present are all furnished by the general election in 1863. We have chosen this, not because it differed in any essential feature from the other contests of a kindred nature which took place under the Second

Empire, but for the reason that the campaign was conducted on the part of the opposition with more spirit than any other, and that consequently it reveals the electoral system of the country in the strongest and clearest light. Our facts are chiefly gathered from the third volume of Delord's *Histoire du Second Empire*, and from *La Lutte Électorale en 1863*, par M. Jules Ferry.

As usual, the imperial manifesto which announced the coming election declared that it would be *free*. The prefects were called upon to address themselves only to the reason of the electors. In addressing these functionaries, M. De Persigny said: "Designate publicly, as in the preceding elections, the candidates which inspire the government with the most confidence. Let the people know who are the friends and who the enemies of the Empire; and let them have full liberty to decide as they choose, but with a full understanding of the cause."

For a government which itself presents and supports a list of candidates, such an announcement would not seem to be unnatural or illogical; but the objectionable features of the method become glaringly apparent when we learn that the government not only gave to the people what it called "a full understanding of the cause," but also that it threatened to withdraw all patronage from those who did not accept its conclusions. It was officially announced by Persigny himself that his Majesty "could not allow about the electors any but men devoted actively, and without mental reservation, to the imperial dynasty."\* Thus in the very beginning of the campaign every official was publicly informed that his continuance in office depended upon his devotion to the interests of the official candidates. In view of these announcements, and in view of that system of centralization which brought everything within imperial reach, the people did not fail to see that it was of the greatest importance to have candidates nominated by the government who should be the least unacceptable to themselves. Accordingly, in some instances peti-

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\* "Il ne peut appuyer auprès des électeurs que des hommes dévoués sans réserve et sans arrière-pensée à la dynastie impériale et à nos institutions."

tions were sent to the government, asking for the nomination of certain persons, a method of procedure which in itself was a complete abdication of all the principles of a free election. As early as August, 1862, *L'Echo de Vesoul* contained a petition, in which the electors of that district prayed the Minister of the Interior to have the goodness to designate for their suffrages the candidature of M. De la Valette. In any country where elections are free, the natural method, of course, would have been for the electors to have nominated their favorite, and then to have elected him ; but in France the people know well that if the administration should not approve of their choice, they would have to enter into a struggle which promised nothing but defeat.

At the same time, when the candidates were announced by the prefects of the various departments, it was declared that no public discussion of the merits of the respective candidates would be allowed. The following extract from a discourse addressed to the electors of the *Haute-Loire* by the prefect of that department will serve as an example of the way in which all free choice of candidates and all discussion of their merits were prevented : —

“ Under the last government, the electors, to supply the place of a general direction, which then they did not have, contrived preliminary meetings, where the candidates declared their principles and submitted themselves to the choice of the people for nomination or rejection. The administration to-day fills, so to speak, the office of the preliminary meetings. We, the administrators, disinterested in the question, and representing only your collective interests, examine, appreciate, and judge of the candidates who are presented. After a full investigation (*mûr examen*), with the sanction of the government, we present to you the one who unites in himself the most sympathies, not as the result of our will, and still less of a caprice, but as the proper expression of your suffrages, and the result of your sympathies.”

Numerous citations like this might be given to show how completely the official candidates were the representatives of the Emperor. In all cases the Emperor chose the prefect, and the prefect, after conferring with the Emperor, nominated the candidate. To call the deputies who reached the *Corps Législatif* by such means representatives of the people is sheer

absurdity. It is not so difficult to understand how Napoleon was willing to resort to such a system of duplicity, as it is to comprehend how an enlightened nation failed to be shocked and outraged by its application.

No sooner were the candidates in the field than the contest began. The overwhelming odds in favor of the official candidates now began to be seen. With free speech and a free press, the candidates of the people could at least have made a vigorous struggle; but with both of these agents taken away they are literally bound and gagged. Writing of this very election, M. Delord assures us that "the journals of the opposition had been killed almost everywhere, and there remained (in each prefecture) only such as were sustained by the government by means of secret subsidies and the judicial announcements." \* As has been already shown, the general government at the very outset had prohibited meetings for the discussion of political topics. There remained, therefore, for the non-official candidates, none of the ordinary methods of publishing their views. They had sole recourse to the mails and to placards; and even these methods were constantly interfered with. The prefect, if he deemed it necessary, did not shrink from interfering with the ordinary functions of the post in order to rob it of any hostile material. Just before the election, the suburbs of Grenoble, containing twenty-five thousand inhabitants, were deprived of all postal communication during twenty-four hours, for the sole purpose of allowing a vigorous and concerted attack to be made upon the opposition candidate at a moment when it was impossible for him to defend himself. Scarcely was an opposition candidate an-

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\* "The *Événement* appeared yesterday before the court of assize of the Seine presided over by M. Perrot de Chezelles. The *Événement* was suspended. The responsible editor was condemned to nine months' imprisonment, and 3,000 francs fine. The author of the article, M. F. Victor Hugo, was condemned to 2,000 francs fine, and nine months' imprisonment. The *Événement* will have four of its editors in prison. Where will the government stop in this path? It will not stop, — it cannot. The *Réforme* has been condemned; the *Peuple* has been condemned; the *Vote Universel* has been condemned; the *Presse* has been condemned; the *Siècle* has been condemned; the *République* has been condemned; the *Assemblée Nationale* only escaped condemnation by submission. And then came the turn of the *National*, of the *Ordre*, of the *Gazette de France*, of the *Journal des Débats*, and of the *Union*." Quoted from the *Presse* by Forsyth, "History of Trial by Jury," p. 361.

nounced when the attacks of the official organs began. If he happened to reside in the district which he hoped to represent, both he and his family were placed under a surveillance which made their sojourn sometimes impossible. They were attacked with a bitter ferocity by the official journals of the locality. The candidate naturally felt the need of replying, and accordingly sought for a printer. If there happened to be two presses in the place, one of them was generally under the patronage of the prefect, and the other under that of the bishop. If by a rare chance one was found who claimed to be independent of these functionaries, he was still obliged to acknowledge his subordination to the laws for the control of the press,—laws by which his office could be closed at any moment. But suppose, as it sometimes happened, that the candidate, by dint of management and the free use of money, surmounted all these obstacles. Three methods of distributing his documents were open to him. They could be committed to the mails; they could be distributed by hand in the street and at the places of resort; they could be put up as placards. Suppose that the candidate intrusts his fortunes to the post-office. One of two things was likely to happen. Either the mass of his circulars found their way into the sewers, or, if they reached their destination, each one was accompanied with an official rejoinder.\* But suppose the candidate determines to rely chiefly or solely upon placards. In every French village the bill-poster is an official who depends upon the authorities for his position; it therefore requires more than ordinary courage in an *afficheur* to lead him to post the *affiche* of the independent candidate by the side of that of his opponent. Both in 1859 and 1863 it happened that candidates were reduced to the actual necessity of arming themselves with pincers and paste-pot, and putting up their own placards.

M. Clapier, a candidate in les Bouches-du-Rhone, with

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\* That this is no exaggeration will appear from the following: "On n'entendait parler de tous côtés dans les temps d'élection que de bulletins en retard, de circulaires égarées, voire, même d'écrits électoraux jetés dans les égouts. Les paquets arrivaient quelquefois, mais; par un prodige singulier, entre chaque circulaire du candidat indépendant s'était glissée une circulaire du candidat officiel, et entre chaque bulletin libre un bulletin estampillé." — Delord, III. 407.

some faithful adherents, spent the greater part of a night in fitting along the walls and dark corners of the city, and sticking up posters with their own hands. Imagine his estimate of the *freedom* of elections in France, when the next morning he found his bills covered with those of the Emperor. One candidate, M. Aristide Dumont, of Noyen, more bold than the others, ventured to complain to the authorities when he found that his posters were destroyed as fast as he could put them up. His zeal subsided, however, when he was informed that, although there was indeed a law against the mutilation of posters, all complaints for violation of that law must be made by the administration. Thus it turned out that whether a man could be punished for destroying a placard depended upon the action of an imperial officer, and whether that officer would act depended upon the nature of the placard destroyed.

But there was one other method open to the candidate, namely, the distribution of documents at the hands of his personal friends. This service, however, required something of the spirit of a hero and a martyr. The distributors were constantly assailed by the jeers and the threats, and sometimes even by the blows, of the officials. Commissioners, mayors, gendarmes, *gardes champêtres*, and *gardes des cantonniers* beset them at all points, and any considerable success was impossible. There are a number of authenticated instances where persons caught in this service were seized, and deprived of their liberty until after the election.

While these difficulties were besetting the non-official candidates, the candidates of the government held undisturbed possession of the field. Their posters everywhere decorated the walls of buildings, the trunks of trees, and the sign-posts at the cross-roads. The mails did for them faithful service, and the telegraph, which could never with safety be used by the opposition, was their ready and faithful messenger. The candidates themselves travelled from place to place in state, supported and protected by a retinue of officials. These latter never hesitated to take any advantage of their peculiar positions in order to accomplish their purposes. Even the inspectors of schools required of teachers not simply a passive but an active

support of the official candidates.\* So much for what may be called the machinery of the campaign ; let us now look at the means by which it was operated.

Under the system of centralization of which we have already spoken, all the public authority of a given district was under the control and direction of the prefect. M. Delord assures us that even the justice of the peace was his docile servant. If an elector originated or circulated any report injurious to the official candidate, the commissioner of police was directed to cause his arrest, and he was at once imprisoned. In such cases it was not even claimed that false charges were made ; it was enough that they were injurious, — *une propagande gênante* being the usual expression. In vain did the non-official candidate offer bail for the good conduct and the appearance at trial of the accused ; the prisoner was held until after the election, when he was generally dismissed without trial. In one instance, where the accused was no less a person than the municipal counsellor of Sainte-Foix, the prisoner was released on satisfactory assurance that he would leave the commune and would not return until after the result of the election should have been declared.

The mayors of the cities were no less zealous than the justices of the peace. The manner in which they were expected to perform their duties may be judged of by the mandate of the prefect of La Manche, which is given merely as a sample of its kind. “Gentlemen,” said he to the mayors of his province, “if you do not expect to vote for the official candidate, resign your scarf the day before the election, in order that it may not be taken away from you the day after.” Perhaps the threat was hardly needed ; at any rate there was no hesitation on the part of the mayors in making themselves the most

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\* Numerous examples in support of this statement might be given. The Inspector of the Académie de la Côte d’Or wrote to the teachers : “Combattre les candidatures administratives, c’est combattre l’Empereur lui-même. En adopter et en patronner d’autres, c’est également servir et recruter contre lui. *Ne pas les combattre, mais aussi ne pas les soutenir, c’est l’abandonner, c’est rester l’arme au pied dans la bataille. Votre indifférence me causerait de la surprise et du regret, votre hostilité serait à mes yeux une lâcheté coupable et sans excuse.*” The Inspector of the Académie des Vosges wrote to the teachers under his supervision in a similar strain. *Vide* Delord, II. p. 409.

active agents of the official candidates. The mayor of Ouistreham appealed to his people in these terms: "Inhabitants of Ouistreham, agents more or less paid boast of being able to make you vote against the candidate of the government. I know your spirit too well to believe that you will allow yourselves to be influenced by any means whatever. Here you have only one sincere friend, and that is I! And when I say to you: Vote for M. Bertrand, it is because this vote is in your dearest interests!!!" The mayor of Jonvelle warned the electors of his precinct that the opposition candidate, M. D'Andelarre was "the protector of the party of the nobility and the clergy; the party which wished to see again such times as those seen when our grandfathers were obliged in turn to beat the water and impose silence upon the frogs in order that the sleep of this or that marquis, or this or that prior, might not be disturbed." "Electors, know that in voting for M. Galmiche you vote for yourselves, for your honor, for progress, for the Emperor who loves you; love him also. Vive la France régénérée! Vive l'Empereur!" The mayor of Kermaria even mounted the pulpit on Sunday, in the place of the *curé*, and preached in favor of the official candidate. Illustrations might be multiplied, but it is perhaps unnecessary. In all parts of France, as might be shown by examples in abundance, the mayors brought the full weight of their official position to bear upon the result. The full significance of this interference with the free expression of the will of the people will be understood only as it is remembered that the mayors in France were not elected by the people, but were appointed by the Emperor. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the authority of the mayor over the voters of his district was in many respects similar to the authority of a custom-house officer in the United States over his subordinates. Both are officers of the general government, and both have the power to make the interests of their official inferiors depend upon the nature of their votes. If this comparison should seem to any one to be unjust to the French, we have only, in reply to any accusation of such a nature, to refer to the array of threats and promises given in the pages of MM. Ferry and Delord.

But the work of the mayors did not stop with threats and

promises. They betook themselves everywhere to the polling-booths, in order to exercise an active *surveillance* over the work of voting. To a foreigner who simply reads the law it would seem that ample provision had been made for the protection of the voter. It was specifically required that the election should be by *secret* ballot,—a fact which would seem to be sufficient guaranty that the elector would be insured in the privilege of voting as he wished; and yet it was found to be not difficult to evade the provisions of the statute. It was necessary that those who had promised and threatened should have some means of knowing positively whether a given elector would be entitled to the promised reward, or whether, on the contrary, he would be deserving of the threatened punishment. To accomplish this end, various devices were resorted to, any one of which would raise an irresistible outcry of indignation in any free country. A common method was to post along the approach to the ballot-box a double line of military and civil officers, each one of whom was commissioned to examine the ballot, and in case of need to exchange the non-official for the official.\* In other places the official ballots were printed upon paper which was easily recognized.† The law that the voting should be secret was interpreted to mean that the ballot should not be opened or scrutinized by those in official charge of the election; accordingly there was no protection for the elector against the interference of the mayor and those other dignitaries who had no such official connection. Even when those in charge of the boxes performed their duty faithfully, of what consequence was it after the elector had already been robbed of his non-official vote,

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\* “Les électeurs de la campagne, pour se rendre dans la salle du scrutin, sont obligés de traverser une sorte de couloir où secrétaire de la mairie, officiers de pompiers, brigadiers de gendarmerie, fourriers de ville, gardes champêtres, cantonniers, sont en permanence et demandent à chaque électeur son bulletin, qu'ils remplacent par le bulletin du candidat officiel si celui qu'ils ont porté le nom du candidat de l'opposition.” — Delord, III. 416.

† “Quelques-uns auraient bien envie de voter pour l'opposition en s'en rapportant au secret du vote garanti par la loi, mais le candidat du gouvernement a écrit son nom sur du papier transparent, et pour plus de précaution, le maire a envoyé aux électeurs dont il se méfie le bulletin officiel piqué ou collé sur leur carte d'électeur.” — Delord, III. 416.

and forced to appear before them with the government ballot only? There is the best of authority for affirming that in many instances the mayors not only seized and destroyed non-official ballots, but that they also declared that whatever the number of votes procured by the candidate of the opposition, the government candidate would be elected.\* It is further to be said that the law requires the ballot-boxes to be sealed, a requirement which it would not seem very difficult to fulfil; and yet we are gravely assured that the means for carrying out this law were in many of the communes so incomplete that the votes were actually cast sometimes into a hat, sometimes into a soup or salad bowl, and sometimes even into the mayor's pocket, held open for that purpose by the mayor himself and by an assistant.†

It would be easy to multiply examples similar to those which we have already given, but out of consideration for the patience of our readers we desist. We should not, indeed, have prolonged the subject so far as we have already done but for the necessity of bringing forward actual proofs of the pressure which was so constantly and so successfully used. Nothing but a presentation of facts is a sufficient answer to the arguments of those who found their approval of Napoleon III. on the belief that from first to last he enjoyed the unswerving support of his people. It is our unalterable belief that a support gained in the manner which we have attempted to show is far worse for a nation than any open and honest opposition to its government can be. It is making use of popular institutions as a mask behind which to hide a system of oppression

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\* "Un grand nombre de maires ouvrent les bulletins et déchirent ceux de l'opposition, affirmant, d'ailleurs, que quelque soit le nombre de suffrages obtenu par le candidat de l'opposition, le candidat du gouvernement sera élu, et, comme pour donner plus de poids à leur affirmation, ils offrent de parier cent contre un que les choses se passeront ainsi." — Delord, III. 417.

† The statement of M. Delord (III. 417) on this subject is so curious that we cannot but quote it. He says: "L'apposition des scellés sur la boîte du scrutin ne préoccupait guère ces fonctionnaires. Ils laissaient au brigadier de gendarmerie ou un maître d'école le soin de se conformer à cette prescription de la loi, assez difficile, du reste, à remplir avec un matériel électoral tellement incomplet que dans un grand nombre de communes on votait soit dans un chapeau, soit dans un saladier, soit dans une soupière, et, à défaut de ces récipients, dans la poche du maire tenue entrebâillée par lui et par l'adjoint ou par le garde champêtre."

and tyranny ; it is prostituting the cause of freedom, and making it subordinate to the ends of despotism. If a people are to be made political slaves, let them at least be spared the mockery of sham liberty, lest they bring all liberty into discredit, and all free institutions into contempt. It may be that an imperial government is the best government for France (though we do not believe that such is the case) ; it is certain that so long as moral principles apply to the welfare of nations as they do to the welfare of men, any government founded and sustained by such a system of *duperie*, to use the forcible word of Taine, as was that of Napoleon III. will end in weakness and ruin. What Shelley said of men as a possibility may be said of governments as a certainty ; and for the reason that with governments the end of all things is in this life :—

. . . . He who gains by base and armed wrong,  
Or guilty fraud, or base compliances,  
May be despoiled ; even as a stolen dress  
Is stript from a convicted thief, and he  
Left in the nakedness of infamy.

But even this is not all. Not only is the government overthrown, but the political life of the nation is paralyzed. “ Nous n'avons pas de vie publique en France,” wrote M. Taine, two years after the fall of Paris ; and the explanation of the truth is in the fact that the public has been so often duped and deceived by the government that it no longer cares what the government is. That the nation is not yet cured of its political ills the world had startling evidence the other day, when M. Gambetta produced in the Assembly the circular of the Minister of the Interior, asking the *préfets* for the names of such political journals as were capable of becoming friendly to the government. The incident affords new proof of the truth of Virgil's declaration :—

Facilis descensus Averni ;  
Noctes atque dies patet atri janua Ditis,  
Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras  
Hoc opus, hic labor est.

CHARLES KENDALL ADAMS.